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Ethical Theory for Catholic Professionals 
James F. Drane, Ph.D. 
The author, a fa culty member at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, 
describes the following as an "attempt to write about ethical theory for 
practicing physicians. " 
Introduction: The Confusing Ethical Landscape 
Physicians today must be conversant with medical ethics , but few have 
time to delve into the philosophical assumptions operating behind many of 
the positions taken by ethicists on clinical questions . Controversy about right 
and wrong in medical practice may result from different ways of interpreting 
the same data , but many times it follows from widely different underlying 
assumptions about what makes any act right or wrong. Practicing physicians 
cannot be expected to be experts on philosophical assumptions in forming 
ethical evaluations (metaethics). It is a big enough job just to learn enough 
about rules and principles to make defensible treatment decisions . But since 
background theories do appear in one form or another whenever doctors 
read about concrete problems , it may be well to provide a quick overview 
of ethical theory for the busy practitioner. 
About 50 years ago , moral philosophers began to make sense out of a 
confusing ethical landscape by distinguishing between two general styles 
of moral theorizing , called deontological and teleologic~l. Since that time 
most ethicists frame their discussions in terms of these categories, providing 
thereby some common linguistic and conceptual categories. Intuitionists , 
emotivists , language analysts , existentialists, and natural law theorists differ 
in their approach to right and wrong but are all able to find a place in or 
around these two general conceptual categories . 
Basic Metaethical Categories 
Deontological theories (from the Greek dean , duty) , include all those 
thought systems which hold that it is possible to say that an act is always 
right or wrong , no matter what the consequences. According to deontologists , 
some acts are intrinsically right and obligatory, others are intrinsically wrong 
and forbidden . Right acts have intrinsic right-making characteristics , and 
wrong acts are .evil for the opposite reason , Deontologists agree that right 
and wrong are not determined by the good or bad results which the acts 
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produce. They are critical of theories which relativize even basic moral norms 
on the basis of beneficial outcome. 
Teleological theorists (from telos , goal) hold that rightness or wrongness 
is determined by an act 's tendency to produce good or bad consequences. 
Generally the teleologists (also called consequentialists) are more liberal 
and relativistic thinkers. They insist on close attention to the special 
circumstance of each act and on a quantification of the good and bad results 
which the act produces before making a judgment about its morality. Moral 
agents in these theories are held accountable for the results flowing from 
their choice. 
Function of Metaethical Categories 
The categories of deontology and teleology are umbrella-like. Under them 
are included different type theories and different style thinkers. The terms 
refer to traditions and orientations more than to a specific theory or system . 
Deontological theories , for example, focus on duty, right and wrong, moral 
norms and imperatives. Teleological theories, on the other hand , talk more 
about goods, results, satisfactions, and common welfare. Comprehensive 
ethical systems like Natural Law have a place for all the above elements. 
The choice of a theoretical model usually reflects a preference for its 
orientation and focus rather than a conviction that others can or should be 
left out of consideration . 
Although the terms deontological and teleological are meant to clarify 
ethical discourse at the most attractive level , a medical professional who 
decides to read in ethics may be confused by the way these terms are used 
by different authors. Accordingly, as writers prefer one or the other 
ori~ntation themselves , the opposite stance often is defined in a narrow, 
less adequate, and instinctively less attractive way. One tends then to get 
different definitions of deontological and teleological and very different 
estimates of the logical extension of these terms. And yet this much can 
always be said reliably : consequentialists stress beneficen'ce or doing good 
for others as the essence of moral obligations. Deontologists, on the other 
hand , stress duty, obligation, and law. Deontologists try to make a case 
for duty for its own sake, or because an act is considered binding on all 
rational beings. For teleologists, however, goodness depends upon an 
evaluation of circumstances and consequences made in light of a particular 
society'S values . What each orientation stresses is a legitimate element in 
ethical evaluation, but something is lacking in each which would make its 
particular focus convincing to the other side. 
The Need for Some Unity in Ethics 
Ethical thinking and discourse were not always so fragmented and 
confusing, because religion , rather than philosophy , once provided common 
background suppositions. Historically there was broad agreement about 
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which acts were right or wrong, based on a common understanding of God's 
will. God's will, as revealed in Scripture, served as the basis for determining 
the morality of acts throughout Judeo-Christian history. Now , however, 
after secularization, any ethical agreement based on our religious heritage 
is gone. To make things worse, an adequate secular substitute for the function 
once filled by a religiously-based ethics has not yet been found. The 
deontological/teleological controversy and all the modern confusion about 
ethics are reflections of a theological gap which philosophies struggle to fill. 
Human Existence as a Unifying Concept 
What is needed in order to create some approximation of agreement about 
morality is a convincing theory of human existence on which all the elements 
of ethics (duties, obligations, and norms, as well as results, satisfactions 
and welfare) can be grounded, and in light of which the basic values peculiar 
to medicine can be given a place within a general system for making ethical 
judgments . Such a theory would provide us with an account of what it is 
to be a person and also what it means to be ill. Based on this account, certain 
acts could be seen as promoting human flourishing, and others as diminishing 
or violating the human. In light of such an understanding, specific acts could 
convincingly be presented as intrinsically right or wrong, and norms based 
on this understanding could be considered absolute. Even the consequences 
of acts would be judged more consistently as good or bad in light of an 
established standard of human flourishing. 
The Alternative to a Convincing Theory of the Human Person 
In the absence of a convincing philosophical anthropology, the 
deontology/teleology controversy centers on the question of whether there 
are absolute moral norms or whether every norm admits of exceptions . Are 
there right acts which in certain circumstances are wrong because of bad 
consequences, or evil acts which are moral because f resulting good 
consequences? Deontologists insist that there are norms which specify actions 
as good or bad, independent or dependent circumstances. Killing the innocent 
is an example of such a norm. Teleologists hold that in extreme conflict 
situations, following even this norm may not be required. 
Deontologists insist that certain acts are intrinsically wrong, and we need 
not be preoccupied with consequences before deciding on their immorality: 
perjury, for example; murder; or doing a patient harm without compensating 
benefit. For the teleologists, these acts are wrong not because the act itself 
is value negative, but because negative circumstances and disproportioned 
consequences are built into the term. All other things being equal, the acts 
of lying and killing and harming are negative and should be avoided ; but 
still, special circumstances and consequences have to be taken into 
consideration. 
If lying hurts other people unjustly , it can be called perjury and absolutely 
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proscribed; killing another unjustly becomes murder and is forbidden for 
the same reason. But lying and killing as physical acts would not be wrong 
absolutely for the teleologist. Only negative physical acts joined to 
disproportionate reasons (considerations of circumstances and consequences) 
constitute moral evils which are always forbidden. In medical practice the 
harming of a patient ordinarily would be wrong because of bad consequences, 
but there may be situations in which violation of patients would produce 
more good than bad results and therefore would be ethically justified. 
What can be made of the differences between deontologists and 
teleologists? Is there any way of overcoming them or coming to an agreement 
on certain basic points? I think so. Deontologists are right in their insistence 
on moral absolutes and intrinsically evil acts. Norms like "never take an 
innocent life , " " never act unjustly ," " never act unreasonably ," " never 
violate a helpless patient " are , in fact , absolute . No exceptions are 
admissible, either because considerations of circumstances and consequences 
are built into the terms " innocent life," " unjust, " " unreasonably ," 
" violate," or because no circumstances can be imagined which would make 
these acts right. Moral terms like murder , perjury , pedophilia , mean that 
the act described lacks a proportionate reason . 
Norms are important because they shape our behavior and influence the 
inner structure of the ethical person. By doing away with norms , we would 
impoverish ourselves ethically. But abstract norms do not solve particular 
moral problems. Is the procedure I am about to perform on my patient just , 
honest, reasonable, respectful of life? The principles " respect life," or " give 
to every person his due," " do no harm," are important but do not tell me 
what specifically to do. Here the teleologist is right in insisting on 
considerations of circumstances and consequences , which always playa role 
in making concrete moral determinations. But given the way we are as human 
beings , certain acts consistently produce bad consequences, which always 
playa role in making concrete moral determinations. But given the way 
we are as human beings , certain acts consistently produce bad consequences 
so that they can be said to be intrinsically evil. 
Mediating the Deontology/Teleology Debate 
The key to mediating between the deontological and teleological 
orientations - and, indeed , the key to overcoming the moral fragmentations 
characteristic of contemporary culture - is a convincing understanding of 
what we are like as human beings. From agreement on what we are like , 
it is a short step to agreeing on how we should act. An act is right because 
it promotes the human, and it is wrong because it distorts or diminishes 
a human person. In medical terms , an act is right when it benefits the patient 
and wrong when it harms or makes the patient' s condition worse. Consistent 
and defensible ethical choices presuppose an order of goods which , in the 
absence of revelation from God, can only be rooted in an understanding 
of the structure of the person and the relationship between doctor and patient. 
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Such an understanding would provide the standards and limits for human 
actions, because it would constitute the basis for making judgments about 
the presence or absence of proportionate reasons for acting . 
Deontologists worry, and rightly so , that purely teleological systems 
sacrifice basic values when good results for the majority are foreseen . A 
comprehensive or integral understanding of human being (including social 
dimensions like family, race , species), however , would furnish absolute 
standards and proscribe certain acts , even if a particular majority realize 
a short-term benefit. Norms rooted in human beings can be both specific 
and exceptionless because they do no( depend upon cultural or c1assbound 
assessments of results . Then, circumstances and consequences of acts may 
be taken into account without worry that these considerations will erode 
moral norms. In effect, the best of both the deontological and teleological 
orientations can be integrated and preserved. The key is a convincing account 
of what it means to be human. 
Where , however, can such an account of human existence and personhood 
be found? Where is there a theory of human being which is comprehensive 
enough to synthesize the major insights of Western thought with the 
traditional values of Western medicine and yet provide room enough tq grow 
and develop in light of emerging research and learning? The benefits of 
this type of moral theory are obvious: it would provide a ground or foundation 
for morality , adherence to the basic moral norms and rules, an ultimate 
source of appeal in cases of conflict between moral principles and rules, 
and a basis on which to evaluate consequences of acts. Once a convincing 
account of personhood is articulated, working toward its flourishing and 
proscribing maleficient behaviors would both be more effective. Such an 
account would unify our rationale for being moral. 
Conclusion: Contributions from Medicine, Philosophy and Religion 
Western medicine, both organic and psychiatric, can h~lp in this project 
because doctors know a great deal about what is good for human life . Western 
philosophy, in its many traditions and styles, holds certain characteristics 
to be peculiarly human and it, too, will playa role. The Judeo-Christian 
tradition provides unwaivering testimony in support of conditions which 
are the prerequisites for human dignity. Finally, the idea that the structure 
of the human person provides the foundation of morality happens to be our 
Catholic tradition at its best. St. Thomas's moral philosophy was based upon 
this idea and Vatican II continued to insist upon the same notion. "The 
moral aspects of any procedure ... must be determined by objective 
standards which are based on the nature of the person and the person ' s acts" 
(The Church in the Modern World, n. 51). The commentary on this statement 
explained that the nature of the person is a general principle which applies 
to all human actions and that in applying this criterion, no single dimension 
of the person can be omitted, isolated or highlighted to the detriment of 
all the rest. The person must be integrally and adequately considered . 
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Morality may seem to some to have disintegrated into a morass of 
relativism and emotivism but physicians generally recognize the need of 
more solid objective standards for doing medical ethics. On the horizon , 
there are reasons for hope. We know at least where the foundation for such 
an ethics lies. And the empirical information needed to build upon that 
foundation is at hand. We know generally what is humanizing and what 
dehumanizes . There will never be a time when all or even most people will 
agree about matters of ethics, but as Catholic professionals, we already have 
a system of ethics which does not ignore the wisdom of the past and provides 
room to integrate the wisdom emerging from contemporary scholarship. 
The challenge is to build wisely on our solid foundation. 
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